

30 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Comments on Joint Study Group Recommendations

1. Re JSG recommendation #1a. All would depend on how this recommendation were executed. If for example all intelligence relating to Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities were made the exclusive responsibility of ONI (which is predisposed to believe that the Sovs can never lay a hand on the Polaris submarines); or if such responsibility for the Soviet anti-ICBM were made an exclusive with Air Force intelligence, the result would in our opinion not forward the national security. This sort of seemingly rational allocation of responsibility could constitute a truly grave peril point.


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2. Re JCS recommendation #1b2. We assume that in the circumstance the three (or four) service intelligence organizations still have separate entities. This recommendation is pure poison and for two reasons:

a. The coordinated substantive intelligence views (for views read "estimates" as they appear in the NIEs and SNIEs) of DOD would even more than at present contain the thrust of JCS policy. This surely would greatly damage what we hope to be the objective findings of national intelligence.

b. For a decade the most important estimates on Soviet weaponry, military policy, and strategy have brought into the open irreconcilable differences of opinion between service intelligence components. These differences are certain to persist. If a "coordinated DOD view" were permitted it would result either in formulations blurred to the point of uselessness or nonsense; or in the complete disregard of a dissenting service position. In this latter case the offended service would easily find the means of bootlegging its dissenting view to high echelons of government. The present scheme with the dissenter right out in the open and in print is a priceless ingredient of the NIE.



3. No JCS recommendation #30. This recommendation begins to make sense only if we assume that a single intelligence unit composed of present service components is put together in the DCS. Even in this case there are objections:

a. Who would it report to? If to the JCS, objections as above in our 2a would obtain. If to the Secretary of Defense, the military would be doing their intelligence business at one step removed and thru civilian channels.

b. In any case there would be no need to have both the Secretary of Defense and JCS represented on the USIB. The one who commanded the intelligence troops should be the only one represented.

If no gathering of service intelligence into a single organization is assumed the objections as above and for recommendation 1b2 hold (see our para 2a & b).

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